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CIVIL PROCEDURE
STEVEN L. BASHWINER* AND BARBARA B. LOUNSBURY* *
THE DECISIONS OF the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit during the past year in -the field of civil procedure have
produced few new developments. For the most part, the Court reit-
erated traditional formulations of standards for such procedures as sum-
mary judgment or dismissal of a complaint.' In several cases, however,
* Partner, of Kirkland & Ellis; member of the Illinois Bar; J.D., University
of Chicago.
** Associate, Kirkland & Ellis; member of the Illinois Bar; J.D., Northwestern
University.
1. The following cases have procedural dimensions but it is beyond the scope of
this article to discuss them: Berghoff Restaurant Co., Inc. v. Berghoff, Inc., 499 F.2d
1183 (7th Cir. 1974) (standard of proof in motion for summary judgment); Lucie v.
Kleen-Leen Inc., 499 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1974) (standard of proof in motion for sum-
mary judgment); Chysler Corp. v. M. Present Co., Inc., 491 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1974)
(standard of proof in motion for summary judgment); Rota v. Brotherhood of Railway,
Airline and Steamship Clerks, 489 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 896
(1974) (standard of proof on motion for summary judgment); Baker v. Chicago Fire
& Burglary Detection, Inc., 489 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1973) (standard of proof on motion
for summary judgment); Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1974) (construction
of pleadings); Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Warren, 497 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1974) (construc-
tion of pleadings); John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973) (construction of prose
complaint); Washington v. Bd. of Education, School District #89, 498 F.2d 11 (7th
Cir. 1974) (dismissal of a complaint); Beshear v. Weinzapfel, 474 F.2d 127 (7th Cir.
1973) (dismissal of complaint for failure to prosecute); Dear v. Rathje, 485 F.2d 558
(7th Cir. 1973) (dismissal of pro se complaint prior to issuance of summons); Vina
v. Hub Electric Co., 480 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1973) (dismissal of complaint for want
of prosecution); Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1973) (motion for
directed verdict); Russell v. Continental Ill. Natil. Bk. and Trust Co. of Chicago, 479
F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1973) (standing to sue); Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.
1974) (standing to sue under Civil Rights Act); TRW, Inc. v. Ellipse Corp., 495 F.2d
314 (7th Cir. 1974) (standing to sue on appellate level); Herreman v. United States,
476 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1973) (standing to sue under Federal Tort Claims Act); Rodri-
guez v. Swank, 496 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1974) (exhaustion of remedies); Nichols v.
Schubert, 499 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1974) (issuance of summons on filing of complaint
in forna pauperis); Heater v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 497 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir.
1974) (calling of adverse witnesses); Greene v. United States, 476 F.2d 116 (7th Cir.
1973) (federal court application of state law); Stevens v. Carey, 483 F.2d 188 (7th Cir.
1973) (federal question jurisdiction); National Family Ins. Co. v. Exchange National
Bank of Chicago, 474 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1973) (statute of limitations); Brainerd v.
Beal and Dunn, 498 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1974) (compliance with the time limitations
in Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure); United States v. Hoffa, 497
F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1974) (award of costs in appeal from criminal conviction); Airline
Stewards and Stewardesses Assn. Local 550 v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th
Cir. 1973) (class actions); Koos v. First National Bank of Peoria, 496 F.2d 1162 (7th
Cir. 1974) (class actions); Kochlacs v. Local Bd. No. 92, 476 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1973)
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the court altered its previous standards, or explained its holding in a way
that may present difficulties in future litigation. Six of these specific
cases will be discussed in this survey.2
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
Three decisions of the Seventh Circuit this term on the payment
of attorneys' fees and costs raise some interesting questions. In Signor-
ile v. Quaker Oats Co.,3 the court reversed the district court's award
of fees for a mistake made by the defendant's attorney in determining
the defendant's principal place of business. In L.F. Strassheim Co. v.
Gold Medal Folding Furniture Co.,4 the court awarded attorneys' fees
as a result of a patentee's "lack of diligence in connection with its pat-
ent application and in responding to pretrial discovery requests." And
in Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp.,5 the court
awarded double costs and damages to defendants in accordance with
rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure."
In Signorile v. Quaker Oats Co., 7 the plaintiff filed suit in the
Northern District of Illinois alleging misappropriation of trade secrets by
Quaker Oats. The plaintiff alleged that he was an Illinois resident and
that the defendant was a New Jersey corporation with its principal place
of business in New Jersey. Although Quaker Oats initially admitted in
(Declaratory Judgment Act); Simmons v. Fenton, 480 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1973) (substi-
tution of defendants); United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973) (discovery
and work product doctrine); Charm Promotions, Ltd. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 489
F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1973) (ex parte communications with jury); United States v. Home
Indemnity Co., 489 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1973) (issues on appeal); Chicago Rock Island
and Pacific RR. Co. v. Wells, 498 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1974) (extensions of time granted
by administrative agencies); United States v. Isaacs and Kerner, Nos. 73-1409 and 73-
1410 (7th Cir., March 28, 1974) (procedures and powers of court specially designated
after active judges withdrew from case); United States v. Cappetto, No. 74-1350 (7th
Cir., Sept. 4, 1974) (civil remedies provisions of Organized Crime Control Act of
1970).
2. Signorile v. Quaker Oats Co., 499 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1974); L.F. Strassheim
Co. v. Gold Medal Folding Furniture Co., 477 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1973); Clarion Corp.
v. American Home Products Corp., 494 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1974); John Morrell & Co.
v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific RR. Co., No. 72-2022 (7th Cir., March 13, 1974);
Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y., 489 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1973); Appleton
Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974).
3. 499 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1974).
4. 477 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1973).
5. Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp., 494 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.
1974).
6. 28 U.S.C., Fed.R.App.P 38. If a court of appeals shall determine that an
appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee.
7. 499 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1974).
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its answer that it was a New Jersey corporation with its principal place
of business in that state, subsequently another attorney from the law
firm that represented Quaker Oats concluded that Illinois-not New
Jersey-was the principal place of business of Quaker Oats and that the
district court was therefore without diversity jurisdiotion.'
Quaker Oats thereupon moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint
and offered to stipulate that all discovery previously completed in the
federal court could be used in any state court proceeding. The plain-
tiff objected to the dismissal on the grounds that Quaker Oats was es-
topped to deny that its principal place of business was in New Jersey
after discovery had proceeded. The plaintiff also requested costs and
attorneys' fees because of the "substantial prejudice" caused by the de-
fendant's faulty admission. The district court rejected the estoppel ar-
gument and dismissed the complaint. However, the judgment awarded
the plaintiff court costs of $548.88 and attorneys' fees of $3,000 as "the
result of defendant's culpable negligence in filing a false answer."9
The Seventh Circuit reversed the award of fees, the only issue be-
fore the court. The court first decided that federal, not Illinois law,
governed the award since diversity jurisdiction, under which the court
would apply Illinois law, never attached in the district court. 10 By anal-
ogy to a federal statute similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1919,11 the only statute
arguably relevent to the case, the court then reasoned that the authority
to award "costs" did not encompass the authority to award fees. Final-
ly, the court decided that the circumstances in this case, unlike those
in Mills v. Electric Auto-lite Co.,12 did not warrant an award of fees
in the absence of statutory authority.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
9. 499 F.2d at 143.
10. The court indicated, however, that Illinois had no applicable statute permitting
the award of attorney's fees. 499 F.2d at 144.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1919 (1970) provides:
Whenever any action or suit is dismissed in any district court for want of
jurisdiction, such court may order the payment of just costs.
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970), an analogous statute provides:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the
following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title. A bill of costs shall be
filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree.
12. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The extraordinary circumstances present in Mills that
led the court to award fees were that the suit was a class action brought to set aside
a merger based on allegedly misleading proxy solicitations and that the suit was brought
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The court articulated four factors that led it to reverse the award
of fees: (1) there was no showing of any financial burden or hardship
to the plaintiff as a result of the incorrect answer; (2) the plaintiff's
access to the state court to refile his lawsuit was unimpaired; (3) the
discovery undertaken while the case was pending in the district court
could be used in a subsequent state court action; and (4) there was
no showing that the defendant's faulty admission was deliberate as op-
posed to inadvertent or negligent.
The logic of the opinion and the authority supporting the court's
position are quite sound.13  A problem, however, may arise in future
application of the case to situations where one or more of the four fac-
tors listed above is absent. For example, the court left open the ques-
tion of whether a party could be liable for fees in the absence of statu-
tory authority if, through negligence, it caused the opposing party to
suffer any harm by its conduct during the litigation.
Unlike the situation in Signorile, the negligence of the defendant
and its attorney led to an award of attorney's fees in L.F. Strass-
heim Co. v. Gold Medal Folding Furniture Co.'4 Although a statute
permitted the award of fees in Strassheim,"5 the distinguishing factor
between Signorile and Strassheim appears to be the extent to which the
plaintif suffered harm.
This action involved a declaratory judgment suit filed by Strass-
heim in 1964 to declare invalid Gold Medal's patent for a director's
chair. The district court found the patent valid and infringed. The
plaintiff appealed, but the parties entered into a settlement agreement
prior to oral argument pursuant to which the plaintiff paid the defendant
$15,000. Less than a year later, the plaintiff moved to reopen the
case on the basis of newly discovered evidence that allegedly showed
that the defendant was guilty of deliberate fraud in filing and defending
its patent. The plaintiff asked for a new trial, treble damages, and at-
torneys' fees, among other relief.
for the benefit of the defendant corporation and its shareholders. Id. at 389-397. Jus-
tice Black dissented from that part of the majority opinion which permitted the recovery
of fees, arguing that the Court should not award fees absent explicit statutory authority.
Id. at 397.
13. See, for example, these cases in which the court discussed the award of fees
in the absence of statutory authority: Fleishmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386
U.S. 718-719 (1966); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939); Bosch
v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Assn., 257 Minn. 362 (1960).
14. 477 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1973).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970) permits an award of fees in patent litigation:
The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.
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The distriot court found that the following circumstances did not
-amount to fraud, but did amount to lack of diligence sufficient to per-
mit the court to award fees. The defendant had filed its patent applica-
tion for a director's chair in December of 1953. However, because
the defendant had publicly sold the chair for more than a year prior
to that date, it had lost its right to patent protection. 6 Although the
defendant's executives were apparently under a mistaken impression
-that they had filed the application within a year, neither the defendant's
executives nor the firm's attorney had attempted to determine the date
of the first public sale.
In analyzing this failure to investigate, -the court found:
The failure to make an appropriate investigation at that time-
particularly since the critical importance of -filing within one year
of the first public offer was obvious to all concerned-reflects an
extraordinary lack of diligence to which we consider it appropriate
to attach legal significance. 17
The defendants also displayed what ,the court considered to be
"lack of diligence" in discovery proceedings. Specifically, in connec-
tion with the deposition of one of the defendant's officers, the plaintiff
requested the production of certain documents, including price lists and
promotional articles published in 1952. Several items from 1952 that
would have disclosed critical facts about the date of the defendant's
public offer were improperly placed in a scrapbook for the year 1953.
Neither the defendant's nor the plaintiffs counsel carefully examined the
1953 book because each accepted the express or implied representations
of the defendant's officers that the 1953 book did not contain any 1952
material. The charitable conclusion was that -the defendant's execu-
tives also had failed to examine the books carefully and sincerely be-
lieved them to be properly arranged.
In the court's view, as a result of both instances of negligent con-
duct, the plaintiff had paid the defendant $15,000 in settlement of an
action it would have won, had waived its right to appeal from any find-
ing of validity of the design patent, and had incurred expenses for fees
and costs of litigation. Accordingly, it views the defendant's lack of
diligence as sufficiently serious to make the case an "exceptional
16. 35 U.S.C. § 102(6) (1970); Amphenol Corp. v. General Time Corp., 397 F.2d
431 (7th Cir. 1968); Armour Research Foundation v. C.K. Williams & Co., 280 F.2d
499 (7th Cir. 1960).
17. 477 F.2d at 82,
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case" under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and awarded attorney's fees for services
performed subsequent to the deposition at which the defendant failed
to produce the critical 1952 documents.
This award of fees appears to represent an extension of the cir-
cumstances under which the Seventh Circuit will award fees and is dis-
turbing in certain respects. Prior to Strassheim, the Seventh Circuit
did not permit an award of fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285 except
to "prevent gross injustice and where fraud and wrongdoing" were
clearly proved.'" In practice this standard meant that the district court
had to find deliberate withholding of information from the Patent Of-
fice or bad faith in instituting an infringement action with knowledge
that the patent was invalid. 19
The single Seventh Circuit opinion cited by the court in Strass-
helm for the proposition that an "exceptional case" did not require
proof of fraud presented circumstances very different from those pres-
ent in Strassheim. In Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis,
Inc.,20 the court awarded fees after it found that the plaintiff, suing for
patent infringement, had hired a former patent examiner from the U.S.
Patent Office (in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of conflict of
interest regulations) and, with the help of the examiner, was attempt-
ing to use statutory provisions on reissuance of a patent to gain control
of the entire industry, a purpose which represented a calculated abuse
of the patent privilege.2'
In predicating the award of fees in Strassheim solely on negli-
gence, the court has joined the Ninth Circuit22 and the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania 23 in holding that gross negligence evidencing disregard
for the truth is sufficient to constitute an "exceptional case."'24 The
troublesome element of Strassheim is that, notwithstanding the court's
18. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 351 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1965); Ellipse
Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 452 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1971).
19. Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 432 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1970);
Shelco, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 466 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1972); Dole Valve Co. v.
Perfection Equipment Co., 458 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1972).
20. 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972).
21. 452 F.2d at 590-597.
22. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 407
F.2d 288 (9th Cir., 1969).
23. Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Industries, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
24. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 407
F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969); Kahn v. Dynamics Corp of America, 367 F. Supp. 63, 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citing Monolith with approval but finding fraud); Mueller Brass C9,
Y, Reading Industries, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1972 .
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insistence that the defendant and its attorney demonstrated an excep-
tional lack of diligence, and that the lack of diligence caused the plaintiff
considerable harm,2 5 the facts as recited by the court do not necessarily
so demonstrate. For example, the defendant's executives apparently be-
lieved in 1953 that the limitation on the time for filing would expire
in early 1954. It is -true that they did not investigate to learn the date
of the first public offer; however, it is not necessarily true that had they
investigated they would have uncovered the true facts. Because the
court did not find that the defendants would have discovered their error
had they investigated, it seems somewhat harsh to attach legal signifi-
cance and punishment to their conduct.
The Seventh Circuit obviously believed it had applied section 285
to suit the section's compensatory purpose.26 Unfortunately, the opin-
ion raises substantial doubts about the nature of the conduct that will
call section 285 into force and the proof that will be acceptable to show
that one party's conduct in fact caused the other party's loss.
The decision in Clarion Corporation v. American Home Products
Corporation2 7 appears to be the first time the Seventh Circuit has as-
sessed double costs and attorneys' fees under rule 38 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure2 s against an appellant appearing pro se.
Since an award of double costs to an appellee is unusual even if the
appellant is represented by counsel, 29 some discussion of the facts is
necessary to explain the court's action.
In 1967 the Clarion Corporation brought an action against Amer-
ican Home Products Corporation for a "finder's fee" of $980,000, al-
leged to be due as a result of Clarion Corporation's activities in effect-
ing the merger between American Home and Ekco Products Company.
The night before trial, the parties agreed to a settlement in the amount
of $490,000 and the case was dismissed without prejudice. Some ten
months later when the settlement documents were ready, Klein, the
25. 477 F.2d at 823-24.
26. The statute's "compensatory" purpose is noted in Mueller Brass, 352 F. Supp.
at 1381.
27. 494 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1974).
28. See note 6.
29. In Flouro Electric Corp. v. Branford Associates, 489 F.2d (2d Cir. 1973), and
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971), the court noted
that an award of costs and single or double damages under rule 38 requires very un-
usual circumstances. See these cases where the court awarded double costs: In re Stol-
kin, 471 F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1973); Oscar Gruss & Son v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co., 422 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1970); Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, 475 F.2d 766 (9th
Cir. 1973).
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president of Clarion Corporation and its sole stockholder, refused to
sign them because of a dispute he was having with Clarion's attorneys
over their fee.
On February 8, 1971, the case was reinstated on American
Home's motion and dismissed with prejudice, the district court retain-
ing jurisdiction solely for the purpose of supervising the exchange of
settlement documents. At the time of the dismissal, Klein represented
to the court that he was prepared to execute the documents.
Nevertheless, on March 16, 1971, when the court ordered that the
parties exchange documents, that the defendants deliver the first annual
payment, and that the proceeds of the payments be divided between
Clarion and Clarion's attorneys, Klein proceeded to appeal the order
pro se, purportedly on behalf of Clarion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
the order.8 0 Thereafter, when Clarion's former attorneys attempted to
enforce their attorneys' lien, Klein, again acting without counsel pur-
portedly on behalf of Clarion, moved to vacate the February 8, 1971,
order dismissing the complaint. This motion was denied by the district
court and Clarion again appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The district
court in the meantime ordered that the defendants pay fees directly to
Clarion's former attorneys and credit the amount against the initial in-
stallment owed to Clarion. Klein also appealed this order. These
latter two appeals were the subject of the decision in the instant case.
Although essentially the same matters had previously been before
the court and Klein had not complied with various limitations on the
timeliness of appeals, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Sprech-
er, patiently investigated the entire record to discover the legal basis,
if any, for Klein's appeals. 3 1  The court decided that Klein's appeals
were premised on two arguments: first, that his consent to the settle-
ment was given without full knowledge of the facts, and second, that
the attorneys' lien must be invalidated if the settlement was invalidated.
The court found that Klein had been fully informed about the merits
30. Clarion Corp. v. American Home Products Corp., 464 F.2d 444 (7th Cir.
1972).
31. The court stated: "We have already in our previous opinion dealt with Klein's
unpersuasive complaints that Clarion's case had somehow not been properly handled.
. . . Nevertheless, we have carefully read through all of Klein's writings to attempt to
fathom his grievances and we have also gone through the entire record in this case to
try to determine whether anything he has said has any basis in fact or whether some-
thing appears in the record which he has not alluded to but which bears the slightest
trace of unfairness or overreaching of Clarion or Klein. We find nothing of that na-
ture." 494 F.2d at 865.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
and weaknesses of his case and about the advantages of settlement, and
that his case had been handled very competently by all of Clarion's and
Klein's former counsel. In essence, the court found Klein alleged a
vague "conspiracy among the trial judge, all of Clarion's and [Klein's]
former attorneys, and most of the local bar (for failing to represent
him in one case where the time to appeal has long since passed and
another case where appeal was taken and lost). .. *32 The court
found his position frivolous and assessed damages of $2,500 for each
appellee and double costs.
Unquestionably the court took cognizance of Klein's status as a
layman and endeavored to give him the benefit of the doubt in judging
the merits of his appeal;3 3 the patience and good will of the court can
only be fully 'appreciated after a perusal of the entire opinion. The
opinion in all likelihood has limited precedential value because the cir-
cumstances of the case were extreme and unlikely to be repeated with
any frequency.
ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE:
In Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp.,3 4 the Seventh Circuit
held that the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, 3 did not pro-
hibit the district court from staying proceedings in a state court that
had not commenced until after a motion to enjoin the institution of
such proceedings had been filed. The decision appears to be one of
first impression although it carefully follows the logic of previous cases
interpreting the statute.
In April of 1972 the plaintiffs filed an action in the federal court
alleging fraud in a high-rise residential building sale-lease-back trans-
action between the plaintiffs, their mortgage broker and one lender.
The defendants then served a notice of default in payment on the plain-
tiffs. In July of 1972 the plaintiffs filed a motion to restrain the de-
32. 494 F.2d at 865.
33. The court stated: "In assessing a penalty we have taken into account the fact
that Klein is a layman but that nevertheless he should have understood that the refusal
of many attorneys to represent him was not a conspiracy but instead a recognition of
the frivolity of his position." 494 F.2d at 866. In another case this term, John v. Hurt,
489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the principle that pleadings
of a layman appearing pro se should be judged by more lenient standards than pleadings
written by an attorney.
34. 489 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1973).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948) provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments,
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fendants from commencing any separate legal action arising out of
the subject matter of the pending case, or taking any other action to
the detriment of the building's reputation as a luxury high-rise dwell-
ing. For the next six months, the parties filed motions and attempted
to negotiate a settlement.
Thereafter, in January of 1973, the defendants filed a forcible entry
and detainer action in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Trial was
set for two weeks later. The day before the state court trial was due
to commence, the district court enjoined the defendants from proceed-
ing with the state court action. The district court held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 was not applicable, or, if applicable, that the statute permitted
the district court to grant an injunction which was "necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction." 6
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order, but its
holding was carefully circumscribed. The court noted that the dis-
,trict court might have been able to enter an injunction when the fed-
eral case was first filed and no state action was pending 7 because the
anti-injunction statute would not apply. At the same time, the
district court did not necessarily have the power to enter an injunc-
tion merely because the federal action was commenced first.38 The
question in the present case was whether the anti-injunction statute
applied after the defendants had begun a state court action while a
motion for injunction restraining such action was pending in the fed-
eral court.
The court concluded that the anti-injunction statute absolutely
prohibited the federal court from issuing an injunction unless one of
the three statutory exceptions applied. 9  Because none of the three
exceptions applied, the federal court could only issue an injunction if
the statute did not apply. The court decided that at the time the
plaintiffs first asked for an injunction, the district court had power to
act because the defendants had not filed their state court action. The
court reasoned that jurisdiction could not be lost by the subsequent
filing of the state court action and that the statute did not apply. The
Seventh Circuit correctly interpreted the statute in this sensible manner;
obviously the federal court needs time to deliberate the merits of issuing
an injunction without fear that defendants will initiate a subsequent
36. 489 F.2d at 935.
37. 489 F.2d at 936, n.8. See also, J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACICE % 0.208(3).
38. 489 F.2d at 936 n.7. See also, J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.208(3).
39. 489 F.2d at 937 and n.9, 10 therein. The mandatory character of the statute
has been disputed (J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.208(3)), but it is the prevailing
view.
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state action that could deprive the federal court of authority to issue
the injunction.4"
The Seventh Circuit's rationale is a logical extension of prior
cases,41 although some problems appear if the case is taken one step
further. An interesting issue will arise, for example, if the Seventh
Circuit is confronted with a situation where a defendant, anticipating or
knowing that a plaintiff intends to ask for an injunction in a pending
federal action, files a state court action before the plaintiff seeks an in-
junction. If the fact that the motion is on file with the federal court in
one case and that the motion is about to be filed with the knowledge of
all parties in the other affords a basis for distinguishing the cases-so
that the court has power to act in the former situation and not in the lat-
ter-then the court, instead of discouraging a race to the courthouse,42
may have in fact encouraged a defendant to file a state court action as
soon as he suspects the plaintiff may seek an injunction in the federal
court.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:
In John Morrell & Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rail-
road Co.,43 the Seventh Circuit decided that the plaintiff's contract ac-
tion on a Uniform Bill of Lading was timely filed. In reaching its con-
clusion, the majority interpreted a series of correspondence between the
plaintiff and the defendant in a manner that raises substantial questions
about the method of disallowing a claim under a Uniform Bill of Lading
Contract.
In September of 1967, Armour and Company refused a shipment
of pork bellies shipped by John Morrell & Co. because the shipment
was allegedly in a damaged condition. In February of 1968, the car-
rier (defendant) sent the shipper (plaintiff) a letter that stated:
40. "Unless the applicability of the statutory bar is determined by the state of the
record at the time the motion for an injunction is made, a litigant would have an abso-
lute right to defeat a well-founded motion by taking the very step the federal court was
being urged to enjoin. Under a defendant's reading of the statute, if a federal court
took time for fair consideration of the merits of a request for an injunction, the court
would deliberate at its peril; its authority to rule on the pending motion could be termi-
nated by the action of one of the litigants. We consider this possibility unseemly. For,
as Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in another context: 'Whether a defendant may be
brought to the bar of justice is not for the defendant himself to decide.' United States
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 310 (concurring opinion)." 489 F.2d at 937.
41. For example, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225; United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258.
42. In Barancik the court mentioned a race to the courthouse as one situation to
be avoided. 489 F.2d at 935, n.5.
43. No. 72-2022 (7th Cir., March 13; 1974).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The loading method used was the sole cause of the inadequate re-
frigeration of this load and the resulting deterioration and loss.
Inasmuch as loading was done by the shipper, no liability for im-
proper loading rests with the carriers.
In the circumstances, we have no option but to hereby disallow the
claim.
4 4
Subsequently, other correspondence was exchanged between the
parties in which the carrier conceded that some part of the damage was
due to its delay and later offered to settle 'the claim. The parties were
unable to reach 'a settlement.
On August 31, 1970, the claimant shipper made another counter
offer. The carrier responded on September 14, 1970, stating that the
claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The shipper filed suit
against the carrier in September of 1971.
The only issue before the district court was whether suit was
barred by a provision in the Uniform Bill of Lading Contract that re-
quires suit to be instituted against a carrier within two years and a day
from the date notice in writing has been given to the claimant that the
carrier has disallowed the claim.45 The district court interpreted the
words "in the circumstances" in the railroad's letter of February, 1968
as a disallowance of the claim; however, since these "circumstances"
were not true and since the court believed that subsequent correspond-
ence showed the parties considered the February letter only a quali-
fied disallowance, the court held that the limitations period did not be-
gin to run until sometime later. The district court granted summary
judgment to the plaintiff based on the pleadings and stipulated facts.
Presumably, the district court agreed with the defendant that once
disallowance had been made, subsequent negotiations did not toll the
limitations period.4" However, the district court stated that the disal-
lowance was not clear because no reference was made to the February
letter until September of 1970 when the carrier wrote that the claim
was barred.
Judges Knoch and Campbell affirmed the district court's order
and its reasoning. Chief Judge Swygert dissented,47 arguing that the
February letter did possess clear finality (contrary to the majority
view) and even if the letter were a "qualified" disallowance, it met
44. Id. at 2.
45. Uniform Bill of Lading Contract § 2(b) and Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 20(ii) (1970).
46. No. 72-2022 at 4.
47. Id. at 6.
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the notice requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act.48 In addi-
tion, he stated that the February letter provided an "objective bench-
mark" from which to measure timeliness and a more suitable bench-
mark than an attempt by the court to determine subjective intent. The
majority's amorphous distinction between qualified and unequivocal
disallowances would, in his opinion, lead to arbitrary and inconsistent
treatment of the parties in future disputes.
CLASS ACTIONS
For several years after rule 23 was amended in 1966, courts of
appeals held that the new rule should be liberally interpreted and that
if error were to be made, it should be in favor of and not against the
maintenance of a class action.49 The resulting willingness of district
courts to certify class actions encouraged suits that were increasingly
ambitious in size and complexity. Many alleged classes contained mil-
lions of persons."
By 1970, it was apparent that mammoth class actions could raise
serious problems of manageability, especially if they proceeded to trial.
Accordingly, the pendulum began to swing back and courts began to
refuse to entertain mammoth class actions on the grounds that their mere
size and complexity made them unmanageable, while other courts lim-
ited the size or scope of alleged classes to make actions manageable."
In Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways 2 the Sev-
enth Circuit showed how premature were the rumors of the death of
the earlier attitude sanctioning mammoth class actions despite burden-
some damages calculations, difficulties of administration, and the large
commitment of judicial resources.
48. 49 U.S.C. § 20(ii) (1970).
49. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968); Esplin v. Hirschi,
402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968).
50. See, for example, the antitrust class action cases discussed in 9 A.L.R. FED.
118.
51. E.g., Hackett v. General Host Corp., 453 F.2d 618 (3rd Cir. 1972). In addi-
tion, there is a series of cases under the Truth in Lending Act in which courts defeated
classes on the basis that potential damages were too great, that there were too many
individual questions of fact, and that defendants should not be punished for the technical
violations of the statute. These cases are couched in language designed to make the
problems with the maintenance of class actions appear peculiar to Truth in Lending cases,
but the rationale does not hold up under rigorous analysis and the problems could easily
be applied to other types of class actions. E.g., Goldman v. First National Bank of Chi-
cago, 56 F.R.D. 56 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D.
104 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 548 (N.D. IMl.
1972).
52. 494 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1974).
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In 1968, the Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau, Inc., an organ-
ization of motor carriers, published proposed rate increases to go into
effect on April 1, 1968. The Interstate Commerce Commission [here-
inafter referred to as I.C.C.] permitted the rates to go into effect but
began investigating the lawfulness of the rates. The I.C.C. ordered
the production of certain information and set a hearing date for May
20, 1968. The carriers requested a 90-day postponement for the pro-
duction of documents and the Commission granted the request on the
condition that the carriers make refunds to the shippers on any ship-
ments moving after May 20, 1968, to the extent that the increases or
any portion thereof were not approved by the I.C.C.
In June of 1969, the Commission issued its report finding that the
increases were not just and reasonable and ordering a refund in accord-
ance with its 1968 order. Subsequently, the commission imposed the
burden for supporting claims for refunds on the shippers who paid the
charges. The I.C.C. refused a request for reconsideration of the re-
fund order. Accordingly, the carriers cancelled the rate increases.
However, they simultaneously filed new and higher increases to be-
come effective as soon as the others were cancelled. After the Com-
mission denied a second request for reconsideration, the carriers sought
judicial review of the orders in Colorado. The district court in Colo-
rado dismissed the carriers' complaint and upheld the Commission or-
der. The Supreme Court affirmed this order.53
Fifty cases in twenty state and federal jurisdictions were there-
upon filed by shippers to collect refunds. Each case consisted of one
to twenty separate complaints; each complaint involved claims of one
to two hundred plaintiffs against one to several dozen defendants.
Several of these actions were filed in the district courts in Illinois.
After preliminary proceedings commenced, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the shippers in eleven of these
cases, holding that the I.C.C.'s refund orders were enforceable as or-
ders for the payment of money; that the defense of invalidity of the
refund order was not available since the district court in Colorado had
already held the refunds valid; and that the refund orders were en-
forceable.54 In another case, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district
court order dismissing the case as barred by the statute of limitations. 55
53. 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
54. Aluminum Co. of America v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc., 486
F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 843 (1973).
55. Container Corp. of America v, Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc., 489
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1973).
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The Appleton case, a class action, was yet another case where
shippers sued to collect refunds. As certified by the district court, the
case consisted of a plaintiff shipper class and a defendant carrier class.
The 17 named defendants and the unnamed defendants appealed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The named defendants contended
that the action should not be maintained as a plaintiff class action be-
cause of its unmanageability and that the defendants should not be
compelled to prepare lists of shippers as the district court required be-
cause the I.C.C. had placed the burden for supporting refund claims
on shippers. The unnamed defendants argued that -the case was not
appropriate as a class action of either plaintiff shippers or defendant
carriers and that class action treatment of defendants " 'without mini-
mal contacts with the State of Illinois will deny them their rights to due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.' ",56
The Seventh Circuit systematically rejected all of these conten-
tions. It attempted to distinguish the Appleton situation from most oth-
er class actions, and from the Eisen5 7 case in particular. First, the
court observed that this class action was brought to obtain money re-
funds; that many of the problems in managing a class action case would
not be present in a refund case (presumably because of the ease with
which notice could be sent to the defendants' customers); that the dif-
ficulties the defendants complained of were of their own making-they
had not set aside any funds, nor kept adequate records of customers
and necessary documents; and that the district court had already ruled
on the substantive merits of the suit.58 Second, the court noted that
class members showed interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit;
56. 494 F.2d at 133. The court rejected this contention by stating that the Inter-
state Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 16(4) (1970), authorized one district court to accept
jurisdiction.
57. The Eisen case to which the Seventh Circuit constantly referred was Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (Eisen 11). The Appleton case
was decided before the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in this case.
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
58. 494 F.2d at 135. There are several problems with the court's rationale on this
point. The carriers were not necessarily like public utility companies which send out
monthly bills to regular customers; it is conceivable that many shippers were occasional
customers only on whom the carriers would not ordinarily maintain files. Yet the court
indirectly analogized the carriers to public utility corporations. In addition, the court
chastised defendants for not maintaining adequate records for easy identification of their
customers, when the I.C.C. order bad placed the burden for proving claims for refunds
on the shippers.
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many shippers had already filed actions and others had attempted to
intervene in the class action."0  Third, the plaintiff never indicated that
it would refuse to pay the cost of notice if ordered to do so, a plaintiff
need not agree to bear costs which the court could assess against defend-
ants, and the Interstate Commerce Act provided that a plaintiff should
not be liable for costs in the district court.60 Fourth, if costs turned out
to be higher than they would have been had the defendants kept better
records, then the defendants should bear the costs.6 In addition, the
court noted that the district judge had employed only procedures that
were clearly permissible in making the class manageable.2 Lastly, the
court stated that Congress had provided for the class action remedy in
in suits based on orders of the I.C.C.
6 3
The court affirmed the district court's orders establishing the
classes and managing initial problems of notice. In so doing, the court
displayed some anger with the carriers for protracting the litigation and
attempting to prevent the maintenance of a class action.
6 4
The real question in any analysis of this case is whether the unique
factual circumstances alone caused the Seventh Circuit to approve the
class action or whether the Seventh Circuit displayed a predisposition
to favor the class action even in circumstances less extreme. The latter
is more likely. If the court had wished to avoid a class action, it could
have found sufficient authority to do so.65 Instead, the court cited with
approval a number of earlier class action cases. 6
59. 494 F.2d at 136. As articulated by the court, this rationale would seem to lead
to the opposite results. If parties plaintiff are interested enough in the subject matter
of the lawsuit to file separate action and defendants are willing to defend a multitude
of such actions, then why is the class action necessary? The court did indicate, how-
ever, 494 F.2d at 136 n.18, that lack of interest due to the size of the amounts claimed
did not necessarily mean that a class action was inappropriate.
60. 494 F.2d at 136.
61. Id. at 137.
62. Id. at 137.
63. Id. at 137. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 16(4) (1970), provides:
In such suits all parties in whose favor the commission may have made an
award for damages by a single order may be joined as plaintiffs, and all of
the carriers parties to such order awarding such damages may be joined as
defendants.
64. The court stated: "The time has come for the carriers to stop spending money
to defeat these rightful refunds and to begin spending money to accomplish them. Man-
ageability will be greatly assisted once the carriers' attitude is one of cooperation rather
than opposition." 494 F.2d at 139.
65. The court could have used some of the reasons given in the Truth in Lending
cases for avoiding the class action. See supra note 51.
66. 494 F.2d at 138-139.
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CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Seventh Circuit in the area of Civil Procedure
during the past years have been soundly reasoned and provide no im-
mediately visible breakthroughs or flat rejections of previous authority.
It is possible, however, that certain of the above decided cases may
foreshadow changes which are not currently apparent.
